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Summary & Conclusions – Dependability evaluation is a basic component in the assessment of
the quality of repairable systems. We develop here a general model specifically designed for software
systems that allows the evaluation of different dependability metrics, in particular, of availability mea-
sures. The model is of the structural type, based on Markov process theory. In particular, it can be
viewed as a attempt to overcome some limitations of the well-known Littlewood’s reliability model
for modular software. We give both the mathematical results necessary to the transient analysis of
this general model and the algorithms that allow to evaluate it efficiently. More specifically, from the
parameters describing : the evolution of the execution process when there is no failure, the failure
processes together with the way they affect the execution, and the recovery process, we obtain the
distribution function of the number of failures on a fixed mission period. In fact, we obtain depend-
ability metrics which are much more informative than the usual ones given in a white-box approach.
We briefly discuss the estimation procedures of the parameters of the model. From simple examples,
we illustrate the interest in such a structural view and we explain how to take into account relia-
bility growth of part of the software with the transformation approach developed by Laprie and al.
Finally, the complete transient analysis of our model allows to discuss in our context the Poissonian
approximation reported by Littlewood for its model.
1 Introduction
Dependability is a central concept in modern systems employing software. By far the most extensive
work on software dependability assessment concerns the modeling of the growth in software relia-
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bility which takes place as a result of fault removal. The nearly exclusively used approach adopts
the so-called black-box view of the system, in which only the interactions with the environment are
considered. It generally gives a good understanding of the product’s behavior during its development
phase. Models associated with such an approach provide the Cdf of the s-time up to the first failure
(see [1]). This output can help, for instance, to decide to stop the testing phase of a product.
If the system is already in operation, the reliability growth phenomenon is not so crucial and the
behavior of the whole system is highly dependent on how the different components are requested. In
this case, the white-box (or structural) point of view is an alternative approach in which the structure
of the system is explicitly taken into account. This is advocated for instance in [2], [3], [4]. In
particular, the structural approach allows one to analyze the sensitivity of the dependability of the
system with respect to the dependability of its components. Moreover, in case of a software system
having some recovery capability, it is of interest to make dependability predictions considering the
influence of these recovery actions on the execution dynamics and of the delays to recover a safe
state. These features are better covered when the components of the system and their relationships are
explicitly considered. It is worth noting that reliability growth is introduced in software dependability
assessment with a structural model in [5]. The used technique can be adapted to our context as it will
be illustrated by a simple example.
In general, the underlying execution model in the structural approach is a Markov chain consid-
ering typically transitions among the execution of different components. Our work is based on the
well-known Littlewood’s model [6]. Our aim is to propose a structural model, working in continuous
time, taking into account a class of failures which affect the execution process. Specifically, we can
include mechanisms to recover a safe state for the system. A basic goal of our paper is to deal with the
delays in recovering an operational state, in order to derive availability measures. In such a context,
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our main result is the distribution of the number of failures in a given bounded interval. This is a very
informative r.v. Its distribution allows, in particular, to analyze the delay up to the first failure, which
is the usual main feature of black-box models. We also consider in some detail the computation of
the mean number of failures in the considered interval, the failure intensity function and the point
availability. The contribution of such a structural model to the software dependability evaluation, in
particular during its operational phase, will be illustrated on few simple situations. A discrete time
counterpart of our work may be developed from Cheung’s model [2],[7].
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we develop a continuous time model which
overcomes some limitations of Littlewood’s one [6], [3]. In particular, we deal here with more general
and informative measures. The main result proposes an analytic and algorithmic representation of the
distribution of the cumulative number of failures over a given interval. We also give specific results on
the expectation of this r.v. The basic mathematical tool is the uniformization technique [8]. At the end
of Section 2, we briefly outline the problem of the estimation of the family of parameters associated
with our model. The last section is devoted to simple illustrations of the practical application of our
results and how the reliability growth of some component may be accounted for. Finally, we discuss
in our context, on the Poissonian approximation given in [6] for the Littlewood’s model.
2 Software dependability with a Markovian structural model
With respect to the black-box approach, just a few papers have been published on structural software
reliability models. A representative sample is (in discrete time) [2],[7],[9] and (in continuous time)
[6],[3],[4], [5],[10].
First at all, we recall the main features of the Littlewood’s model [6] which are common to most
of the previous cited works. That will introduce in a natural manner, our nominal model developed in
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the next subsection. In a first step, Littlewood defines an execution model of the software. The basic
entity is the standard software engineering concept of module as for instance in [2]. The software
structure is then represented by the call graph of the set C of the modules. These modules interact by
execution control transfer and, a each instant, control lies in one and only one of the modules which
is called the active one. ¿From such a view of the system, we build up a stochastic process X = (X
t
)
which indicates the active module at each time t. This process is assumed to be a homogeneous
Markov chain on the set C.
In a second step, Littlewood describes the failure processes associated with execution actions that
gives a view of the software in operation. Failure may happen during a control transfer between two
modules or during an execution period of any module. During a sojourn of the execution process in
the module i, failures are part of Poisson process having parameter 
i
. When control is transferred
between the modules i 2 C and j 2 C, a failure may happen with probability (i; j).
The architecture of the software can be combined with the failure behavior of the modules and
that of interfaces into an operational model which can then be analyzed to predict dependability
of the software. This method is referred as the “composite-method” according to the classification
of Markov models in the white-box approach proposed in [11]. Basically, we are interested in the
process (F
t
)
t0
where F
t
is the cumulative number of failures observed at time t. If the inter-failure
period are much smaller than the switching rates modules, Littlewood states that (F
t
)
t0
is a Poisson
process with parameter
 =
X
i2C
(i)[
i
+
X
j2C
(i; j)]
where  is the stationary distribution corresponding to the Markov process X . Analogous results are
reported in [3] when X is assumed to be a semi-Markov chain. Such results give a “hierarchical-
method” [11] for reliability prediction: we solve the architectural model and superimpose the failure
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behavior of the modules and that of the interfaces on to the solution to predict reliability. Note that:
 failures have no influence on the execution process. The software is instantaneously operational
(with probability 1) even if delays are invoked in using some handling errors capability.
 User has a priori no information on the quality of an eventual Poissonian approximation.
The Subsection 2.3 proposes an algorithmic and analytic assessment of a richer operational model
evolving in continuous time. That includes the transient analysis of the counting process associated
with Littlewood’s model. We quote that a recent work [12] proposes an extension of the Littlewood’s
model to take into account the effect of the workload on the performance of the software in a multiuser
environment. However only steady-state measures are provided for 2-users, 1-module systems.
2.1 A nominal model
The first step in the structural approach to evaluate the dependability of a complex software system is
to define an nominal model taking into account the knowledge of the structure, the potentially avail-
able data and the measures that will be calculated. Concerning the first point, the main assumption
is that the system can be seen as a set of interacting components. This interaction is only made by
execution control transfer and, at each instant, control lies in one and only one of the components,
which will be called the active one. For a discussion on the concept of software component in the
context of this paper the reader can see [10]. Component definition is a user-level task, depending on
the system being analyzed, on the possibility of getting the required data, etc. As previously quoted,
the first idea is to identify the components with the modules. The main problem with this approach is
that the Markovian (or semi-Markovian) assumption for the call graph may be too much unrealistic.
For instance, suppose that module M
i
receives the execution control sometimes from module M
j
,
sometimes from module M
k
. In many situations, the conditions under which the control is transferred
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and the characteristics of the tasks that must be performed by M
i
may be completely different in the
two cases. If M
i
is a state of a Markov process, then the r.v. “nth sojourn time in M
i
” is independent
of the other sojourn times (in M
i
and in the other states), does not depend on n and does not depend
on the identity of the module from which the control is got. Thus, such a Markovian assumption may
be too strong to be acceptable. Similar considerations can be done on the exponential distribution of
the sojourn time in a module, on the switching transition probabilities between states, etc.
To avoid (at least, theoretically) the preceding drawbacks, we follow a different approach. Con-
sider a partition of the whole code and call components its elements. Assume, for instance, that control
starts in component C
i
. After executing some subset of internal code, the services of component C
j
are requested. Once C
j
finishes this job, C
i
ends in turn and control is transferred to component C
k
which, in turn, request immediately the service of C
j
. Instead of constructing three states C
i
, C
j
and
C
k
, we propose the scheme of Figure 1.
C
k
=C
j
C
i
=C
j
C
i
Figure 1: A component requested from two different places
The state labeled ‘C
i
=C
j
’ represents the execution control in C
j
when it has been transferred from
C
i
and the same for ‘C
k
=C
j
’. The main idea is to store in a state information on the path (of compo-
nents) having transferred the control, if it is necessary to make the Markovian assumptions realistic.
As in previous structural models, when a component C
i
transfers the control to either C
j
or C
k
, we
will model the situation by means of probabilistic jumps of the associated stochastic process. We will
not discuss on the flow process modeling aspect further. The reader can find similar constructions to
handle control structures (loops, tests, : : : ) for in Beizer’s book [13]. Needless to say, it is clear that
we have to identify only a few components leading to a moderate number of states (“labeled paths”)
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because a model is not extremely useful without data and the more complex it is, the more difficult is
the measurement task. This situation is also met in other software engineering activities as in testing,
where the models used are very close to the previous one (see [13]). To end this discussion, it remains
to underline that the goal here is to give a general description of the approach, not a complete specifi-
cation of a new formalism. This must depend at least on the type of implementation language(s), the
required detail level, the mechanisms that need to be included in the model, etc.
We will assume in the sequel, the nominal model is represented as the state graph of a homoge-
neous time-continuous Markovian process X . Its state space is denoted by C = f1; 2; : : : ;Mg. The
process is characterized by its infinitesimal generator, denoted by Q = (Q(i; j)) i; j 2 C, and by its
initial distribution  = (
1
; : : : ; 
M
). The entries Q(i; j) are to be interpreted as the output rate from
state i to state j, i.e. the parameter of the exponential distribution of any sojourn time in the state i
weighted by the proportion of routing to state j, in absence of any failure phenomenon. The distri-
bution  can be seen as the vector composed by the respective proportion of input nodes selection
in the graph by the user, and thus it is called the using profile. We will assume X irreducible. This
is because either the user does not distinguish any particular run end in its model and considers the
continuity of the execution, or because there are states i representing final tasks and, in that case, we
add transitions from i to every state j with transition probability 
j
.
2.2 The operational model
In this section we develop a model which represents the system in operation. Formally, this consists in
constructing a more complex stochastic process starting from X , by considering the fact that failures
may happen and their possible effects on the system. We divide the failures in two types. The first
one is composed by the primary failures and the occurrence of such a failure is a primary event. A
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primary failure leads to an execution break; the execution is restarted after some delay for instance
from a checkpoint or perhaps from the beginning. The second class of failures is composed by the
secondary failures (their occurrences are the secondary events). Such failures have no influence on
the evolution of the model in that the execution process is assumed to be restarted instantaneously
where the failure appears. They are those which are taken into account in [6].
Next, retrieving a safe state involves, in general, a random delay. Our model will allows us to
assess the quality of the service with respect to the alternation continuity-suspension of the execution
process, i.e. the availability of the system (see [8]). We suppose that the delay following an execution
break is a random variable with a phase type (PH) distribution (see [14] for information on such a
distribution). In that case, we denote the set of transient states associated with this PH distribution
by R and these states will be referred as the recovery states. The sub-generator composed by the
transition rates between elements of R is denoted by R. The phase type assumption allows us to
represent times to recover an operational state which depend on the identity of the failed component.
Indeed, the sequence of successive visited states in R can be related to the first state entered, which
is the first recovery state selected by the failed component.
So, the nominal process is replaced by a process modeling the alternation operational-recovery
periods. The main mathematical assumptions are the following.
 When the active component is i, a primary failure occurs with constant rate 
i
. The secondary
events (secondary failures) are part of a Poisson process having rate 
i
. Always during a sojourn
in state i, the two types of events are independent of each other.
 When control is transferred between two components, failures may also happen. If i and j are
two states of the model such that transitions from i to j model control transfers, then a primary
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(resp. secondary) interface failure occurs with probability (i; j) (resp. (i; j).) In order to
simplify the technical evaluation of the model, we accept the occurrence simultaneously of the
two types of failures (with probability (i; j)(i; j)), with the result that the primary one will
be taken into account only. In the model, we set (i; j) = (i; j) = 0 if the transitions from
state i to state j do not correspond to control transfers.
The introduction of distinct failure parameters for a transfer of control and for an “internal”
execution is needed if the failure data are not gathered in a representative environment of the
interactions between the components.
 Given a sequence of executed components, the failure processes associated with each state are
independent. Also, the interface failure events are independent on each other and on the failures
processes occurring when a component is active.
 If a primary event occurs during the execution of component i or when a control transfer takes
place from component i, then (i; j) is the probability that j 2 R is the first visited recovery
state.
 Let us define X = (X
t
)
t0
as the process which gives either the active component or the
recovery state reached at time t. Its state space is the set E = C [R. Given a sequence of states
of E , the failure and recovery processes are assumed to be independent too. We assume that
matrix S = (S(i; j))
(i;j)2RC
of the transition rates between a recovery state to an operational
state is given. We have (R+S)1T = 0. The alternation operational-recovery periods is infinite
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by assuming the generator Q of the Markov chain X is irreducible:
i; j 2 C : Q

(i; j) = Q(i; j)(1  (i; j)) if i 6= j and Q(i; i) = Q(i; i)  
i
;
i 2 R : Q

(i; j) = R(i; j) if j 2 R and Q(i; j) = S(i; j) if j 2 C;
(i; j) 2 C R : Q

(i; j) = [ 
i
+
X
k 6=i;k2C
Q(i; k)(i; k) ](i; j):
The proposed set of failure processes can be seen as the superposition of the failure processes
considered in [6] (or [3]) and [4]. In papers like [6] the considered failures are those called secondary
here. We see this fact as a limitation and our model attempts to avoid it by introducing the primary
failures which affect the execution process.
It is worth noting that distributions (S(i; j))
j2C
(i 2 R) may represent a re-direction of the control
flow which results from use of recovery actions. For instance, (primary) failures in a critical compo-
nent that provoke a complete reset of the system is handled by setting, for any j 2 C, S(i; j) = 
j
if
i is the last state corresponding to the recovery phase; it means that the jump is performed according
to the using profile distribution, independently of the state in which the failure occurs. Finally, let
us drop the recovery data. If a failure happens “in” component i then the probability distribution
((i; j))
j2C
models the effect on the execution control.
2.3 Model analysis
The r.v. F
t
is the cumulative number of primary or secondary failures over the interval ]0; t]. At t = 0,
we assume that F
0
is 0, i.e. Pr(F
0
= 0) = 1. We propose to deal with the following dependability
indicators: the distribution function and the expectation of the r.v. F
t
; the time to the first failure; the
point availability and the failure intensity function.
The first active component is i 2 C with probability 
i
(i.e. Pr(X
0
= i) = 
i
) and for all i 2 R,
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Pr(X

0
= i) = 0. To analyze the process F = (F
t
)
t0
, let us consider the bi-dimensional time-
continuous process (F;X) = (F
t
; X

t
)
t0
. It follows from the independence assumptions that this is
a homogeneous Markovian process over the state space N  E . Let us denote
a(i; j) = transition rate from state i 2 C to state j 2 C without any failure;
d
(s)
(i; j) = transition rate from state i 2 C to state j 2 C with a secondary failure occurrence;
d
(p)
(i; j) = transition rate from state i 2 C to recovery state j with a primary failure occurrence.
We denote by F (p)
t
(resp. F (s)
t
) the cumulative number of primary (resp. secondary) failures observed
over ]0; t]. Therefore, for all t  0, we have by definition F
t
= F
(p)
t
+ F
(s)
t
.
The following expressions for these rates can be derived by listing the different failure or recovery
events:
a(i; j) = Q(i; j)(1  (i; j))(1  (i; j)) if i 6= j et i; j 2 C;
a(i; i) = 0 if i 2 C;
d
(s)
(i; i) = 
i
if i 2 C;
d
(s)
(i; j) = Q(i; j)[1  (i; j)](i; j) if i 6= j et i; j 2 C;
d
(p)
(i; j) = [
i
+
P
k 6=i;k2C
Q(i; k)(i; k) ](i; j) if (i; j) 2 C  R:
After checking that, for any i, we have
P
j2C
[a(i; j)+d
(s)
(i; j)]+
P
j2R
d
(p)
(i; j) =  Q(i; i)+
i
+
i
and denoting by 
i
this value, let us define the three matrices A, D(p) and D(s) by
A = (a(i; j))
i;j2C
  diag(
i
)
i2C
D
(p)
= (d
(p)
(i; j))
(i;j)2CR
D
(s)
= (d
(s)
(i; j))
i;j2C
(diag(
i
) denoting the diagonal matrix with value 
i
in its (i; i)-entry). The generator of the homoge-
neous Markov chain X over state space E may be rewritten as
Q

=

A+D
(s)
D
(p)
S R

:
Example 1 Let us briefly discuss now some particular cases of the present operational model Op. To
replace these well-known models in their usual framework, we drop the recovery delays assumptions.
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The first one is the Littlewood’s model. There is no primary failure, that is 
i
= 0 and (i; j) = 0
for all i; j 2 C. Hence, we consider the point process of the only secondary events. Note that the
generator Q = A+D(s)+D(p) of the chain X given the active component in the operational model
is also the generator Q of the execution process X . We retrieve the fact that the failures do not affect
the evolution of the execution process.
Another interesting point process is the one obtained from Littlewood’s model by assuming that
the probability of a secondary failure during a control transfer is 0. Adding conditions (i; j) = 0 for
all i; j 2 C in the previous context, we get A = Q  diag(
i
) and D(s) = diag(
i
). This is a Markov
Modulated Poisson Process (or MMPP) extensively used for instance to analyze the performance of
data statistical multiplexers.
Example 2 Let us assume that our software system is constituted of five components denoted by
C
i
; (i = 1; : : : ; 5). The parameters of their exponential execution times have been estimated to
 Q(1; 1) = 1,  Q(2; 2) = 0:5,  Q(3; 3) = 0:5,  Q(4; 4) = 1,  Q(5; 5) = 1 where time is in
hours. Figure 2, confined to the nodes associated with the five components, gives the transition graph
of the nominal process X of the system.
Concerning the transition rates between components, we have Q(1; 2) = 1, Q(2; 3) = 0:025,
Q(2; 4) = 0:475 and Q(3; 5) = 0:5. For the sake of simplicity, we consider only primary failures
and the failure rate for each component is assumed to take into account the occurrence of internal and
interface failures. Components C
4
and C
5
are the only ones for which a non-zero failure rate is avail-
able: 
4
= 0:03 and 
5
= 0:01. After a failure has occurred in C
4
(resp. C
5
), retrieving a operational
state involves a s-time distributed as an exponential distribution with parameter  R(1; 1) = 5 (resp.
 R(2; 2) = 10). The two recovery states are denoted by R
1
and R
2
.
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We define two different operational models (Op)
1
and (Op)
2
from the distinct conditions to re-
cover a safe state after a failure. We assume for (Op)
1
that execution restarts from the component
which has failed as in [3]. The transition graph of (Op)
1
is given by in the l.h.s of Figure 2. For the
second model (Op)
2
, execution restarts always in component C
1
. The transition graph is in the r.h.s
of Figure 2.
R
1
C
3
C
4
C
5
C
2
R
2
C
1
Model (Op)
1
Model (Op)
2
R
1
C
3
C
4
C
5
C
2
R
2
C
1
Figure 2: The operational model with five components and two recovery states
2.3.1 The distribution function of F
t
We state the main result. This result is obtained in a similar way as in [15, Th3.1] with help of the
well-known uniformization technique [8]. Therefore the proof is omitted.
Result 2.1 Let us set u = supf i 2 C; j 2 R : jA(i; i)j; jR(j; j)j g. For all t  0, we have
Pr(F
t
 k) = poif(k; ut) +
1
X
h=k+1
e
 ut
(ut)
h
h!
x
T
C
(k; h) (1)
where the column vector xT
C
(k; h) is deduced from the system of relations:
x
T
C
(k; h) =
b
A x
T
C
(k; h  1) +
b
D
(p)
x
T
R
(k; h  1) +
b
D
(s)
x
T
C
(k   1; h  1) h; k  1;
x
T
C
(0; h) =
b
A x
T
C
(0; h  1) h  1;
x
T
C
(k; 0) = 1
T
k  0;
x
T
R
(k; h) =
b
R x
T
R
(k; h  1) +
b
S x
T
C
(k   1; h  1) h; k  1;
x
T
R
(k; 0) = 1
T
k  1:
9
>
>
>
>
>
>
=
>
>
>
>
>
;
(2)
where bA = I + A=u, bR = I +R=u, bD(s) = D(s)=u and bD(p) = D(p)=u.
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Result 2.1 leads to evaluate the probability Pr(F
t
 k), for k and t fixed, by the series (1). We recall
the inherent error due to the use of the uniformization technique: if we truncate the series (1) at level
H > k then
1
X
h=H+1
e
 ut
(ut)
h
h!
x
T
C
(k; h)  poisfc(H; ut) (since xT
C
(k; h)  1):
Hence, the algorithm can be resumed as (a) choose the tolerance error "; (b) compute H such that
poisfc(H; ut) < "; (c) compute the vectors xT
C
(k; h) for h = 0; : : : ; H with system (2).
Example 3 (Example 2 continued) The two models are analyzed by means of the matrices
A =
0
B
B
B
B
@
 1 1 0 0 0
0  0:5 0:025 0:475 0
0 0  0:5 0 0:5
0 1 0  1:03 0
1 0 0 0  1:01
1
C
C
C
C
A
D =
0
B
B
B
B
@
0 0
0 0
0 0
0:03 0
0:01 0
1
C
C
C
C
A
R =

 5 0
0  10

;
S
1
=

0 0 0 5 0
0 0 0 0 10

for (Op)
1
and S
2
=

0 0 0 0 5
0 0 0 0 10

for (Op)
2
.
Figure 3 gives the graph of the function t ! Pr(F
t
 k) for (Op)
1
(with k = 0; : : : ; 3). Numerous
dependability indicators follow from the knowledge of the distribution of F
t
. For k = 0, we have the
zero-failure feature of the system, that is its reliability function. It also allows us to answer a question
as “up to what time t the probability to observe at most 2 failures is greater than 0:95 ?” We get
t  88h using the algorithm.
Time to the first failure. It follows from the second and third renewal equations in (2) that the time
to the first failure T for the operational model Op has a phase-type distribution:
Pr(T > t) = Pr(F
t
= 0) = e
At
1
T
:
Then, the previous algorithm is merely the computation of the state probability for an absorbing
Markov process by means of the uniformization technique.
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Figure 3: Function (Pr(F
t
 k))
t0
for (Op)
1
with k  3
Point availability. The point availability function is defined at t by the probability A(t) that the
system is operational at t. This means that the identity process X indicate one of the components at
time t:
A(t) =
X
i2C
Pr(X

t
= i) =
X
i2C

(; 0)e
Q

t

(i):
Since X is an irreducible chain, the row vector (; 0)eQt tends componentwise to the stationary
distribution  as t tends to infinity. We retrieve the usual expression
P
i2C
(i) of the asymptotic
point availability A(1).
2.3.2 Expected number of failures over ]0; t]
Let us define the column vector DT over E by
D
T
=

(D
(p)
+D
(s)
)1
T
0

:
The scalar DT(i) (i 2 C) gives the occurrence rate of a failure “from” the component i. Vector cDT
will denoteDT=u. The expectation of the r.v. F
t
is obtained in computing the series
P
k0
Pr(F
t
> k)
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with help of formula (1):
8t > 0 : E[F
t
] =
1
X
h=1
e
 ut
(ut)
h
h!
(; 0)
 
h 1
X
k=0
c
Q

k
!
c
D
T (3)
where cQ = I +Q=u. This series may be evaluated in the same way as for the distribution function.
We deduce E[F (p)
t
] and E[F (s)
t
] from the relations E[F (p)
t
] = E[F
t
]
D
(s)
=0
(see Remark below) and
E[F
(s)
t
] = E[F
t
]  E[F
(p)
t
].
Failure intensity function. In conditioning with respect to the visited state by the Markov chain X
at time t, the failure intensity function h(t) is easily derived:
h(t) = lim
dt!0
1
dt
Pr(F
t+dt
  F
t
= 1) = (; 0)e
Q

t
D
T
:
We note that this function tends to  =
P
i2C
(i)[
P
j2C
D
(s)
(i; j) +
P
j2R
D
(p)
(i; j)] as t grows.
The previous expression of the failure intensity allows us to represent E[F
t
] as
E[F
t
] =
Z
t
0
h(s)ds =
X
i2C
E[S
i
(t)] [
X
j2C
D
(s)
(i; j) +
X
j2R
D
(p)
(i; j)] (4)
where E[S
i
(t)] is the mean execution time of the component i over ]0; t]. Finally, we obtain from (4)
that
8t > 0; E[F
t
] = (D
T
)t + (; 0)(I   e
Q

t
)(1
T
  Q

)
 1
D
T
: (5)
The rate 
d
= D
T is the so-called fundamental rate of the (failure) point process in the Neuts’s
terminology (see [14]). Note that 
d
=
P
i2C
(i) [
P
j 6=i
Q(i; j)(i; j) + 
i
] for the Littlewood’s
model (with R = S = 0), where  is actually the stationary distribution of the execution process.
This the parameter of the Poisson process used in [6] as approximate failure point process. In the
model MMPP, we have
P
i2C
(i)
i
.
Remark If we are not interested in counting the secondary failures, that is, if we want to evaluate
the distribution of F (p)
t
only, it is sufficient to set parameters ((i; j); 
i
)
i;j2C
to 0 in the definitions of
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matrices A and D(s). This remark holds also for evaluate the number of failures corresponding to a
subset of components in the Littlewood’s model. Indeed, since all failures have no influence on the
execution process, i.e. X = X , it is sufficient to assume that all the parameters associated with the
events having no incidence on the interesting part of the system are 0. For instance, if we are only
interested in the failures invoked by the component i then we set to 0 all the parameters 
k
; (k; j)
k 6= i; j 2 C, and we use Result 2.1 and (3).
2.4 Estimation and use
A major limitation to the validation of software reliability models was during a long time the lack
of published data. It seems to be overcome in the context of black-box modeling [16]. Typical data
associated with this approach is the sequence of failure instants or simply the number of failures
observed over a fixed period. In general, some parametric model of the system is chosen and the
observations of the failure times (or of the number of failures) are used to adjust the parameter values.
However, the problem of data is not covered with structural modeling. To the best of our knowledge,
there exists no published data which can give support to the general validation of the structural model
approach. Concerning its application to a specific system, let us briefly outline the principal problems
related to the estimation of the parameters (see also [17] for a complete discussion).
Prior to the complete system integration it can be envisaged that the failure rates of the components
will be estimated, for example, by means of simulations or using the numerous black-box software
reliability models [1]. A careful examination of the consequences of these failures must be done to
classify them into primary or secondary. Of course, we will not necessarily have 
i
6= 0 for each
component i, and the same concerning the secondary failures.
Let us say now a few words about the behavior of the repair time. The problem of fitting a PH-
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distribution from the observation of its two first moments, for instance, is standard. Recall that, in
particular, this allows to represent regular delays, where the exponential assumption would be too
far from reality. Again, it is likely that the user will be able to establish a priori what component
will be executed after a given recovery period following a specific primary failure. It can then be
expected that parameters S(i; j) can be evaluated prior to the integration phase. The same remark
holds with respect to the parameters (i; j). Indeed, the constant probability (i; j) can be viewed
as the proportion of primary failures (attached to component i) which involve a delay distributed
according to a phase-type distribution with first state j.
Let us look now at the remaining matrices that need to be estimated. The simpler way to have in-
formation on the interface failures consists in measuring the proportion of i! j component transfers
which fail. The estimation of the Q(i; j) transition rates implies in turn to count the number of times
each of the possible transitions occur. Many transition rates Q(i; j), probabilities (i; j), : : : will be
zero since most of the transitions will probably be impossible. Some of the remaining non-null values
can perhaps be “exactly” known, for instance from the analysis of the programs structure. In the same
way, we can suppose that in many applications there will be no secondary event in the model. In any
case, a general observation about model design is that the final number of components should be kept
as small of possible, the main reason for this being the availability of data concerning failure rates and
failure probabilities. This leads to look for a tradeoff between the description power of the model and
the problem of estimating the parameters. Note that an alternative to analytical models as discussed
in this paper may be based on discrete-event simulation (see [18]).
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3 Various comments
3.1 Further analysis of Example 2
The proposed structural model allows to analyze the sensitivity of the dependability of the whole
system with respect to the dependability of its components. For instance, suppose that we want to
achieve a probability greater than 0:95 to observe at most two failures over a time period of at least
ten days (i.e. over ]0; t
inf
] with t
inf
= 240h). A failure may happen only in component C
4
or C
5
according to the respective parameters 
4
and 
5
. It is desirable to decide a priori what component
must be mainly examined to achieve the fixed objective and what is the required amount of work.
We can observe for our simple example that component C
4
is the relevant one. The computations
confirm this choice since if the residual failure rate 
5
decreases by a factor of 10 then we only obtain
a gain of two hours for the initial lower bound (i.e. t
inf
' 90h). On the other hand, dividing the rate

4
by 3 allows to attain t
inf
' 257h that ensures the fixed requirement. The 0-failure and 2-failures
characteristics are both given by Figure 4 for a residual failure rate 
4
of 0:01 and 0:03.
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Figure 4: Function (Pr(F
t
 k))
t0
with 0:01 and 0:03 as value of 
4
in the model (Op)
1
.
The perturbation on the distribution of F
t
generated by the change of first executed component
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after occurrence of a failure, betwen the models (Op)
1
and (Op)
2
, may be easily evaluated. It is clear
that function t ! Pr(F
t
 k) will be all the less perturbated as the number k of considered failures
is smaller. In particular, for k = 0, the reliability function is identical for the two models since no
recovery mechanisms have been invoked over ]0; t]. For our example, the difference between the
values of Pr(F
t
 k) for (Op)
1
and (Op)
2
attains 10 2 over the interval [50h; 250h] with k = 1, is
more than 10 2 over [110h; 450h] with k = 2 and is close to 2:10 2 over [200h; 450h] with k = 3.
Note that we obtain t  95h as answer to the question raised in Example 3 for model (Op)
2
. That
represents a difference of about 8% on the upper bound time with respect to the first model.
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Figure 5: Function (Pr(F
t
 k))
t0
with k = 2; 3 for the models (Op)
1
and (Op)
2
3.2 Reliability growth
The main purpose of the software reliability models using the black-box view of the system is to
take into account the stochastic phenomenon of reliability growth. It takes place when efficient fault
removal procedures are used. In a structural approach, this situation has been addressed by Laprie
et al. [5]. The basic idea is to choose a black-box model to represent the reliability growth of a
component and to use the so-called transformation approach for introduce this single-component
model in the Markovian structural one. The failure in a component are assumed to occur according
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to a hyperexponential non-homogeneous Poisson process. The transformation approach is based on
the Markovian interpretation of this black-box model (see [5]). We can also simulate the reliability
growth of some components in our model using this technique. The transition graphs associated with
models (Op)
1
and (Op)
2
become those given in the Figure 6, when the reliability of component C
4
grows.
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Figure 6: Operational models taking into account the reliability growth of component C
4
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1
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.
As a result of the algorithm associated with Result 2.1, we state that the r.v. F
t
is s-non-increasing,
that is, if (F
t
)gr denotes the number of failures observed over ]0; t] taking into account the reliability
growth of C
4
, Pr(F
t
 k)  Pr((F
t
)gr  k) for each k 2 N .
Let us return to the question “up to what time t the probability to observe at most 2 failures
is greater than 0:95?” for the model (Op)
1
and for the model derived from the reliability growth
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of component C
4
with parameters 
sup
= 0:0585 and 
inf
= 0:0015. That gives a growth ratio

4
=
inf
= 20 and an initial value h(0) = 
4
. We determined t  88h for (Op)
1
and now we get
t  97h. We see that the gain on the upper bound is about 10%.
3.3 Poissonian approximation
The generator Q of the nominal (Markov) model X was assumed to be irreducible in Subsection 2.1;
hence matrix A is also an irreducible sub-generator. It is well-known [14] that a phase-type distribu-
tion with an irreducible matrix A is asymptotically exponential with the eigenvalue of maximal real
part   of matrix A as parameter. So, we obtain
Pr(T > t) = e
 t
+ o(e
 t
);
with o(e t)=e t ! 0 when t! +1. The scalar  may be interpreted as the asymptotic failure rate
of the system when t tends to +1. Indeed, we have
(t) =
X
i2C
e
At
(i)
e
At
1
TD
T
(i)  !
t!+1
(1) =
X
i2C
v(i)D
T
(i)
where v is the unique probability distribution satisfying to vA = v. Consequently, we have  =
(1). We can note that for all i 2 C, v(i) and (i)=
P
i2C
(i) are distinct quantities ( is the
stationary distribution of X). Finally, if the distribution of the r.v. T is asymptotically exponential
then it does not mean that the counting process of the events is necessarily distributed as a Poisson
process with parameter .
We have already noted that, when t ! +1, the failure intensity function becomes the following
constant value h(1) = DT and that, for the Littlewood’s model (with R = S = 0), the fundamental
rate 
d
is equal to the parameter of the Poisson distribution given in [6] as approximated distribution
for the counting r.v. F
t
. In this case, recall that  is also the stationary distribution of the nominal
22
model X . Let us try to compare the exact distribution of F
t
for model (Op)
1
with the Poisson one
with the asymptotic failure rate (4)D(p)(4; 6)+(5)D(p)(5; 7) = (4)0:03+(5)0:01 as parameter.
We state that the Poissonian approximation gives a very little under-estimation of the dependability
of the system associated with the model (Op)
1
. Consequently, the computation of the measures
with this Poisson distribution ensures that the reliability specifications are met. However, the same
conclusion does not hold for the model (Op)
2
. Indeed, the same type of comparison shows that the
Poissonian approximation, first over-estimates the dependability of the software, next under-estimates
it. Therefore, we have a priori any order relation between the reliability indicators obtained from the
Poisson process and those resulting from the exact initial model.
For a Markov model, we know that the asymptotic probability (i) to be in state i is equal to
lim
t!1
(E[S
i
(t)]=t). When the observation period becomes large, formulas (4) and (5) provide the fol-
lowing asymptotic expressions of the expected characteristics
lim
t!1
E[F
t
]
t
= D
T
= 

d
E[F
t
] = 

d
t+ [(; 0)  ](1
T
  Q

)
 1
D
T
+ o(1):
We can see that if we consider the stationary version of the point process of the failures instants (i.e.
the initial distribution (; 0) of X is replaced by its stationary distribution ), then we have, for all
t > 0, E[F
t
] = 

d
t and h(t) = 
d
.
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